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FUTURE DAMAGES IN ADEA CASES
TIMOTHY E. HAWKS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 19671 (ADEA) is to promote employment of older per-
sons based on their ability rather than age and prohibit arbi-
trary age discrimination in employment.2 The ADEA makes
it unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire, discharge, or
discriminate against an employee with respect to conditions of
employment because of the employee's age. 3 Those who vio-
late the ADEA are liable for a variety of damages set forth in
both the ADEA4 and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).5
The statutory remedial framework is complex and has
spawned substantial litigation. This article focuses on the re-
cent ADEA developments involving the availability of relief
for damages continuing beyond the date of trial.
"The purpose of the ADEA is to make persons whole for
injuries suffered as a result of unlawful employment discrimi-
nation." 6 This elementary "make-whole" proposition has
proved to be beguilingly deceptive in its application to individ-
ual ADEA cases.7 One cause for difficulty in the application
of "make-whole" relief is rooted in the difficult evidentiary
problems of proving economic damage caused by the loss of
employment. Although these problems with respect to dam-
ages occurring exist before' and after trial, they become most
apparent when the plaintiff attempts to demonstrate prospec-
tive damage. They can be overcome, however, and determina-
* B.A., Georgetown University, 1974; J.D., University of Iowa, 1977; Partner,
Shneidman, Myers, Dowling, Blumenfield & Albert, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1982).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1982).
6. Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093, 1097 (8th Cir. 1982), cited in
Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922 (6th Cir. 1984).
7. See Comment, Front Pay As a Remedy Under The Age Discrimination In Em-
ployment Act of 1967, 19 U.S.F.L. REV. 187 (1984).
8. See Special Project, Back Pay In Employment Discrimination Cases, 35 VAND.
L. REV. 893 (1982).
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tions of future wage loss are common in personal injury,
worker's compensation, and Title VII litigation. 9 A secon-
dary cause for confusion lies in the ADEA's provision of liqui-
dated (doubled) damages for willful violations of the Act. 10
These are "intended to provide full compensatory relief for
losses that are 'too obscure and difficult of proof for estimate
other than by liquidated damages."'11 The interrelationship
between awards of liquidated damages and future damages re-
mains problematic. 12 However, if future damages are capable
of proof, they ought not be offset by liquidated damages.
This article will review the statutory and judicial authority
which allows, even requires in appropriate circumstances, an
award of front pay. It will focus on the judicially imposed
requirement that an ADEA plaintiff must be able to show that
in order to recover front pay reinstatement is not equitably
appropriate and that the damage stemming from the illegal
act is reasonably ascertainable both in amount and in time be-
yond date of trial in order to recover front pay. Finally, it
recommends a policy that the determination of entitlement to
front pay and the assessment of its amount ought to be dis-
tinct from the allowance of liquidated damages.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The remedies available under ADEA are statutorily
provided:
9. Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983):
"Courts and juries are not without experience in assessing damages for future loss of
earnings in breach of employment contract and personal injury cases." See, e.g.,
Balczewski v. DILHR, 76 Wis. 2d 487, 251 N.W.2d 794 (1977) (proof of future wage
loss following a nonscheduled injury under Wisconsin worker's compensation law); see
also Note, Front Pay - Prophylactic Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 29 VAND. L. REV. 211 (1976).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
11. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 13-14, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 528-35 (citing Overnight Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 583-
84 (1942)).
12. Compare Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984) (al-
lowing both liquidated and future damages) with Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771
F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1985) (denying reinstatement, holding "front pay" available under
ADEA, but affirming denial of "front pay" on grounds that plaintiff recovered liqui-




The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accord-
ance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in
section 211(b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof), and
217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this section. Any act
prohibited under section 623 of this title shall be deemed to
be a prohibited action under section 215 of this title.
Amounts owing to a person as a result of a violation of this
chapter shall be deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or
unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of sections 216
and 217 of this title: Provided, That liquidated damages
shall be payable only in cases of willful violations of this
chapter. In any action brought to enforce this chapter the
court shall have jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of this
chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling
employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the
liability for amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages
or unpaid overtime compensation under this section.13
Equitable relief is also countenanced:
Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any court
of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as
will effectuate the purposes of this chapter: Provided, That
the right of any person to bring such action shall terminate
upon the commencement of an action by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission to enforce the right of such
employee under this chapter.' 4
However, the Seventh Circuit rejected the above as a source of
remedial power since in its view the "sole effect" of the above-
cited section is "to give individuals the ability to take advan-
tage of the relief conferred in § 626(b)."1 5
A brief synopsis of the provisions of the FLSA which are
expressly incorporated within the ADEA is in order. Section
211(b) provides for federal and state cooperation in the en-
forcement of the FLSA. 16 Section 216 contains the heart of
the FLSA remedial authority. 17 Its principal components rel-
13. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (emphasis in original).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1982) (emphasis in original).
15. Pfeiffer v. Essex Wire Corp., 682 F.2d 684, 686 (7th Cir. 1982).
16. 29 U.S.C. § 211(b) (1982).
17. In relevant part, 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982) provides:
(b) Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207
of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of
their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the
1986]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
evant to this article are as follows: (1) Any employer who
violates the minimum wage or overtime provisions is liable for
case may be, and additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any employer
who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for
such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of
section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment, rein-
statement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal
amount as liquidated damages. An action to recover the liability prescribed in
either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against any employer (in-
cluding a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction
by any one or more employees for and on behalf of himself or themselves and
other employees similarly situated. . . . The court in such action shall, in addi-
tion to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable
attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action. The right
provided by this subsection to bring an action by or on behalf of any employee,
and the right of any employee to become a party plaintiff to any such action,
shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary of Labor in an
action under section 217 of this title in which (1) restraint is sought of any fur-
ther delay in the payment of unpaid minimum wages, or the amount of unpaid
overtime compensation, as the case may be, owing to such employee under sec-
tion 206 or section 207 of this title by an employer liable therefor under the
provisions of this subsection or (2) legal or equitable relief is sought as a result of
alleged violations of section 215(a)(3) of this title.
(c) The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of the unpaid mini-
mum wages or the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee or
employees under section 206 or section 207 of this title, and the agreement of
any employee to accept such payment shall upon payment in full constitute a
waiver by such employee of any right he may have under subsection (b) of this
section to such unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation and an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages. The Secretary may bring an
action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the amount of unpaid
minimum wages or overtime compensation and an equal amount as liquidated
damages. The right provided by subsection (b) of this section to bring an action
by or on behalf of any employee to recover the liability specified in the first
sentence of such subsection and of any employee to become a party plaintiff to
any such action shall terminate upon the filing of a complaint by the Secretary in
an action under this subsection in which a recovery is sought of unpaid mini-
mum wages or unpaid overtime compensation under sections 206 and 207 of this
title or liquidated or other damages provided by this subsection owing to such
employee by an employer liable under the provisions of subsection (b) of this
section, unless such action is dismissed without prejudice on motion of the Secre-
tary. Any sums thus recovered by the Secretary of Labor on behalf of an em-
ployee pursuant to this subsection shall be held in a special deposit account and
shall be paid, on order of the Secretary of Labor, directly to the employee or
employees affected. Any such sums not paid to an employee because of inability
to do so within a period of three years shall be recovered into the Treasury of the
United States as miscellaneous receipts. In determining when an action is com-
menced by the Secretary of Labor under this subsection for the purposes of the
statutes of limitations provided in section 255(a) of this title, it shall be consid-
ered to be commenced in the case of any individual claimant on the date when
the complaint is filed if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the com-
[Vol. 69:357
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such amounts owing plus an additional equal amount for liq-
uidated damages; (2) any employer who engages in retaliatory
discrimination or discharge is liable for such legal or equitable
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of
§ 215(a)(3), including without limitation, employment, rein-
statement, promotion and the payment of wages lost and an
additional equal amount in liquidated damages; and (3) the
employer is liable for a prevailing plaintiff's reasonable attor-
ney's fees and costs of the action.18 Section 217 provides the
district courts with the authority to issue injunctions in order
to restrain violations of the FLSA. 19
Since 1960, it has been well settled that the FLSA clothed
the courts with the authority to "provide complete relief in
light of the statutory purposes. ' 20 This includes orders of re-
imbursement and reinstatement.21 Moreover, the FLSA was
amended, effective January 1, 1978, to specifically authorize
the courts to use appropriate equitable relief to remedy retalia-
tory discharge cases.22 The statutory examples of equitable re-
lief do not expressly include compensation in lieu of
reinstatement; however, the amendment specifically provides
that the examples are "without limitation" on the courts'
powers.23
In Lorillard v. Pons,24 the Court analyzed the interrela-
tionship between the FLSA and ADEA. It noted that "[t]his
. . . selectivity that Congress exhibited in incorporating pro-
visions and in modifying certain FLSA practices strongly sug-
gests that but for those changes Congress expressly made, it
plaint, or if his name did not so appear, on the subsequent date on which his
name is added as a party plaintiff in such an action.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1982).
19. Injunction Proceedings, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1982).
20. Mitchell v. De Mario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
21. Id. See also Reeves v. International Tel. and Tel. Corp., 616 F.2d 1342, 1354
(5th Cir. 1982); Goldberg v. Bama Mfg. Corp., 302 F.2d 152, 156 (5th Cir.1962).
22. Pub. L. No. 95-151 §§ 10(a) & (c) (1977).
23. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) provides:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title
shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectu-
ate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation
employment, reinstatement, promotion and the payment of wages lost and an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages.
Id. (emphasis added).
24. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
19861
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intended to incorporate fully the remedies and procedures of
the FLSA."25 At the time the Court issued Lorillard, the
FLSA specifically provided for a broad grant of equitable
powers to the courts to remedy retaliatory discharge and dis-
crimination. Presumably, this grant was incorporated fully
within the ADEA and corresponds to the ADEA's own broad
authorization of equitable relief.
III. JUDICIAL ANALYSIS REGARDING THE RIGHT TO
FRONT PAY UNDER THE ADEA
A. Decisions Holding that ADEA Relief
Encompasses Front Pay
The First, Second, Third, Sixth, and Eighth through Elev-
enth Circuits have held that front pay is available under the
ADEA. 26 None of the circuit courts have held to the con-
trary. Most decisions rely upon the notion that the purpose of
the ADEA is "to make victims whole."' 27 This may be accom-
plished by reinstatement; when reinstatement is not possible
or practical, then it is appropriate to grant damages in lieu
thereof. In all cases, the "make-whole" purpose imputed to
the ADEA is grounded upon the provision of 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) which provides that the court "shall have jurisdiction
to grant such equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectu-
ate the purposes of this chapter. '28
In a comment characteristic of a broad view of the scope
of the ADEA, the Tenth Circuit noted that "the ADEA is
remedial and humanitarian legislation and should be liberally
interpreted to effectuate the congressional purpose of ending
25. Id. at 582. The ADEA modified the FLSA by specifically allowing plaintiffs,
other than the Secretary of Labor, to initiate actions seeking equitable relief; the ADEA
unlike the FLSA requires a showing of willfulness in order to recover liquidated dam-
ages, and the ADEA does not incorporate the FLSA provision of criminal penalties for
violation of the Act.
26. See, e.g., Wildman, 771 F.2d 605 (1st Cir. 1985); Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766
F.2d 788 (3d Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166
(10th Cir. 1985); Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1985);
Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984); Davis v. Combustion
Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984); O'Donnel v. Georgia Osteopathic Hosp., Inc.,
748 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Co., 695 F.2d 1093 (8th
Cir. 1982); Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982).
27. Davis, 742 F.2d at 922.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
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age discrimination in employment."29 More pointedly, the
Second Circuit noted:
Denial of reinstatement in those situations [when impracti-
cal or impossible], without an award of reasonable offsetting
compensation would leave the plaintiff irreparably harmed
in the future by the employer's discriminatory discharge,
and would permit the defendant's liability for its unlawful
action to end at the time of judgment. To prevent this injus-
tice a reasonable monetary award of front pay is necessary as
"equitable relief. . . appropiate to effectuate the purpose of
[the Act]."3 °
In the quote that follows, the Tenth Circuit incorporated
and specifically agreed with the reasoning of the trial court in
Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Company :31
The manifest purpose of this broad grant of legal and equita-
ble power is to enable the courts to fashion whatever remedy
is required to fully compensate an employee for the eco-
nomic injuries sustained by him. The power so granted is
sufficient to authorize an award of future loss of earnings in
appropriate cases. To deny that authority would defeat a
purpose of the act to make a' victim of discrimination
"whole" and to restore him to the economic position he
would have occupied but for the unlawful act of his em-
ployer. To deny such authority would remove a deterrent
force against future violations.32
The First Circuit, which had been cited by a number of
other courts33 and commentators34 as opposed to the award of
29. Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977).
30. Whittlesey, 742 F.2d at 728.
31. 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
32. Prudential, 763 F.2d at 1172 (citing Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F.
Supp. 1161, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (footnotes omitted)).
33. In Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003 (Ist Cir. 1979), the First Circuit re-
served decision on this issue, as the trial court had not passed on it, but suggested that
prospective awards of continuing payments or substantial awards based on life expec-
tancy would be inappropriate. Id. at 1022-23. Then, in Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694
F.2d 869 (1st Cir. 1982), the court stated in a footnote that "damages are 'settled' on the
date of judgment and the plaintiff cannot then recover damages for future economic
loss, or front pay, even though the injury continues." Id. at 874 n.4. This ambivalent
footnote dicta was reviewed by a number of subsequent decisions including, for exam-
ple, Davis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 922 (6th Cir. 1984). However, in
Wildman v. Lerner Stores Corp., 771 F.2d 605 (Ist Cir. 1985), the court held that front
pay was available under the ADEA if reinstatement was not possible or practicable, but
it cautioned that since future damages are often speculative, the trial court should con-
1986]
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front pay in ADEA cases, has recently held to the contrary.
Adopting the court's analogy it "bit the bullet" and adopted
the following rule: "Future damages should not be awarded
unless reinstatement is impracticable or impossible; the dis-
trict court, then, has the discretion to award front pay. Be-
cause future damages are often speculative, the district court,
in exercising its discretion, should consider the circumstances
of the case, including the availability of liquidated
damages. 31
B. Decisions Holding that Front Pay is Not Allowed
Under the ADEA
Several district court decisions have held that front pay is
not available under the ADEA.36 Typically their analyses are
controlled by a restrictive reading of the remedies provided
under the FLSA. In Helwig v. Suburban Chevrolet,37 the
court commented that the monetary awards recoverable
under the FLSA are explicitly stated, and there is not a gen-
eral damages provision which provides for remedies such as
front pay. In Monroe v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,3 the court
concluded that reinstatement was the solitary form of equita-
ble relief allowed. If the plaintiff did not seek or refused an
offer of reinstatement, any claim to future benefits was for-
feited. In Foit v. Suburban Bancorp,39 the court noted that the
inherently speculative nature of future damages rendered
them inappropriate under any circumstances.
sider the circumstances of the case, including the availability of liquidated damages. Id.
at 616.
34. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 197.
35. Wildman, 771 F.2d at 616.
36. See, e.g., Helwig v. Suburban Chevrolet, 33 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA)
1261 (D. Md. 1983); Foit v. Suburban Bancorp, 549 F. Supp. 264 (D. Md. 1982); Jaffee
v. Plough Broadcasting Co., 19 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1194 (D. Md. 1979);
Price v. Maryland Casualty Co., 391 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Miss. 1975), aff'd, 561 F.2d
609 (5th Cir. 1977); Monroe v. Penn Dixie Cement Corp., 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga.
1971).
37. 33 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1261 (D. Md. 1983).
38. 335 F. Supp. 231 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
39. 549 F. Supp. 264 (D. Md. 1982).
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IV. CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH REINSTATEMENT IS
NOT PRACTICABLE OR POSSIBLE
Reinstatement is the preferred remedy and front pay may
be available only when reinstatement is not possible or practi-
cal. Two courts have held that reinstatement should be de-
nied only under "exceptional circumstances."' The
preference for reinstatement follows the intention of Congress
in creating the ADEA.
A stated purpose of the Act is "to promote employment of
older persons based on their ability rather than age."' 41 It is to
insure that "older individuals who desire to work will not be
denied employment opportunities solely on the basis of age."'42
The trial court must fashion equitable relief in light of a stat-
ute's intent and purpose and may deny equitable relief only if
it does not frustrate the statute's intent.43 Therefore, ordering
reemployment of older employees is ordinarily preferred
under the statute.
The Tenth Circuit comments that reinstatement also
serves to protect the discharged employee and demonstrates
the employer's good faith to other employees.44 A court
which chooses not to order reinstatement must explain why
that choice furthers the purposes of the ADEA.4 5 The prefer-
ence of the plaintiff for front pay rather than reinstatement is
not enough in and of itself to justify a denial of reinstate-
ment.46 Antagonism between the parties which occurs as a
"natural bi-product [sic] of any litigation" is also not ade-
quate.47 An apparent unavailability of jobs is not a basis to
deny reinstatement, at least when defendant's counsel has as-
sured the court that the defendant would find comparable jobs
40. See Dickerson v. Deluxe Check Printers, Inc., 703 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1983);
Babb v. Sun Co., 562 F. Supp. 491 (D. Minn. 1983).
41. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (emphasis added).
42. H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 504.
43. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
44. EEOC v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600, 628 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Local 883
UAW v. NLRB, 300 F.2d 699, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 82 S. Ct. 1258 (1962)).
45. Blim v. Western Elec. Co., 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir. 1984).
46. Id.




for the plaintiffs as close as possible to the region in which
they worked.48
However, intense animosity between the parties justifies
denying reinstatement. 49 Although reinstatement may pose
difficulty in any employment dispute, it is particularly prob-
lematic in age cases. The cases frequently involve senior em-
ployees in managerial, supervisory, or administrative roles
whose duties call for personal judgment in sensitive matters
ranging from personnel decisions to the commitment of the
employer's resources. They are likely to have access to highly
confidential business information. In each of these situations,
a rupture of trust between the employee and the employer is
likely to impair the relationship to the extent that the em-
ployee would be foreclosed from performing substantial ele-
ments of former job duties.
Although the line between "natural antagonism" and "in-
tense animosity" may not always be clear, record testimony
may well provide a clue to the distinction. The trial court in
Whittlesley v. Union Carbide5" found the animosity between
the plaintiff, an attorney, and his employer, Union Carbide
Corporation, to be so intense that reinstatement was impossi-
ble. The court found that Union Carbide had exhibited "such
hostility and outrage' 51 against the plaintiff that he would
have difficulty functioning again in Union Carbide's law de-
partment and that he would be "ostracized and excluded from
the functions of giving counsel. '5 2 In Cancellier v. Federated
Department Stores,53 testimony by an officer of the defendant
that a plaintiff was a "cancer", coupled with numerous attacks
by the defendant on plaintiff's abilities, was enough to con-
vince a court that the plaintiff and defendant could no longer
"coexist in a business relationship that would be productive to
the consumer, community or to the business itself."' 54 Conse-
quently, reinstatement was denied.
48. Babb, 562 F. Supp. at 493.
49. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. Union Carbide Corp., 742 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1984).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 729.
52. Id.
53. 672 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982).
54. Id. at 1319-20.
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The unavailability of work may justify denying reinstate-
ment. In Davis v. Combustion Engineering,55 the Sixth Circuit
denied reinstatement where the plaintiff was fifty-nine years
old at the time of trial and had less than six years to
mandatory retirement.. 6 The defendant had substantial re-
ductions in work force and suffered from continuing business
declines making plaintiff's termination prior to retirement
probable. In Gibson v. Mohawk Rubber Company,5 7 the
Eighth Circuit ruled implicitly that reinstatement may be de-
nied if the jury concluded that the plaintiff would not have
been retained by the defendant as a consequence of a plant
closing.
None of the courts have suggested that hostility or un-
availability of work are the exclusive circumstances in which
reinstatement would be inappropriate. A plaintiff who be-
comes disabled subsequent to being discharged and is physi-
cally unable to perform former duties obviously could not be
reinstated. However, if the plaintiff would have been entitled
to long term disability insurance benefits 8 or an augmented
pension benefit, but for the termination, an award of future
pay in such amounts would seem appropriate.5 9 Likewise, a
discharged employee who has relocated in order to mitigate
damages, albeit at a lesser income, might fairly argue that re-
instatement which would require moving again, would be in-
appropriate. A plaintiff whose work involved customer or
client service resulting in personal allegiances might fairly ar-
gue that reinstatement would be inappropriate if those rela-
tionships have been severed and would be difficult to renew,
particularly if income would be premised upon fees for serv-
ices rendered.
55. 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
56. Id. at 917.
57. 695 F.2d 1093 (8th Cir. 1982).
58. The treatment of insurance benefits remains problematic. The Seventh Circuit,
in Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 161 (7th Cir. 1981), affirmed a
trial court's decision to deny the plaintiff's claim for reimbursement of medical expenses
which would have been covered by the defendant's group health insurance benefits since
plaintiff had not purchased health insurance following the discharge. Presumably, if the
plaintiff had purchased insurance, the court would have allowed recovery for the cost of
the health insurance premiums paid by the plaintiff.
59. See, e.g., Loeb, 600 F.2d 1003, 1021 (lst Cir. 1979).
1986]
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Moreover, a court exercising its equitable power of rein-
statement must be cognizant of the potential unintended vic-
tims of an order of reinstatement. Reinstatement of a plaintiff
to a prior position is likely to result in the "bumping" of an
employee. Although it is convenient to suggest that the re-
placement employee reaped a windfall opportunity by virtue
of the employer's illegal conduct, the suggestion is simplistic.
Judgment in an ADEA case may well follow the discharge by
three to four years. In the interim, subsequent personnel
changes are probable. Alternative career opportunities may
have been foregone. In such a case, reinstatement may place
the cost of the defendant's illegal conduct upon other parties.
The decision to reinstate, although preferred under the
ADEA, is one calling for the sound discretion 60 of the court
and turns on the application of a full range of equitable princi-
ples. It should not be mechanically applied nor casually re-
viewed. An order which creates hardship, not only for the
defendant, but also for the plaintiff and the plaintiff's co-em-
ployees, does not further the purposes of the ADEA, but in-
stead will erode public confidence in the Act.
V. PROVING FUTURE DAMAGES
The inherently speculative nature of future damages has
led some courts to conclude that they are unavailable per se.61
On the other hand, proponents of front pay argue that "the
mere fact that damages may be difficult of computation should
not exonerate a wrongdoer from liability. 'The most elemen-
tary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of uncertainty which his own
wrong has created.' ",62 Moreover, risks of speculation may be
minimized in light of the plaintiff's obligation to mitigate
damages. In addition, after computing the employee's work
and life expectancy, the court may use the discount tables to
determine the present value of future damages.63
60. Gibson, 695 F.2d at 1101.
61. See, e.g., Foit v. Suburban Bancorp, 549 F. Supp. 264, 267 (D. Md. 1982) (cit-
ing Covey v. Robert A. Johnston Co., 19 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 1188 (D. Md.
1977)).
62. Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(citing Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946)).
63. Prudential, 763 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 1984).
[Vol. 69:357
FUTURE DAMAGES
In those cases in which future damages have been allowed,
courts have calculated the amount by computing the probable
income from the defendant between trial and retirement. This
sum is reduced by outside income and the discount for a lump
sum payment of a future stream of income. For example, the
court awarded $60,107 as front pay in Koyen v. Consolidated
Edison Company.64 It determined that the plaintiff, who was
sixty-eight years old at the time of the jury's verdict, was un-
likely to be reemployed. It then calculated the income that
plaintiff would have received for twenty-three months between
the date of the verdict and the date of the plaintiff's seventieth
birthday using his pre-termination salary rate.6 Additionally,
the court added an amount which the parties acknowledged
reflected the value of benefits for this period. From this sum
the court deducted the value of monthly pension benefits re-
ceived. This sum was then discounted by what the court iden-
tified as the current rate of interest.
In Maxfield v. Lerner Stores, Inc. ,66 the jury applied a sim-
ilar analysis to find that the plaintiff was entitled to $7,500 in
future damages. The defendant argued to the trial court that
it was error for the jury to determine future damages without
the benefit of expert testimony to establish the plaintiff's eco-
nomic value in the labor market and the appropriate discount
rate. The argument failed, however, as the court noted that
the plaintiff had agreed to a discount rate of ten percent. Ac-
cording to the court, this was far in excess of the "real interest
rate" approved in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation v. Pfeif-
fer,67 which is defined as the difference between the market
interest rate and the inflation rate. The Maxfield court also
noted that there was a great deal of record evidence on the
plaintiff's earnings at the time of discharge, his replacement's
earnings, and the conditions of the industry. Thus, there was
64. 560 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
65. Id. at 1169. This figure represents $38,050 per year ($3,170 per month) or
$72,910 for twenty-three months.
66. 36 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) 87 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
67. 462 U.S. 523 (1983).
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more than an adequate basis to uphold the jury's
determination.68
Prospective entitlement to pension benefits presents addi-
tional complex issues. In Loeb v. Textron,69 the First Circuit
ruled that the defendant may not rely upon its own illegal act
to deny a claim that plaintiff's pension rights, which had not
vested prior to discharge, may be deemed vested for the pur-
pose of computing damages. A secondary, but potentially
more important issue, centers upon the value of the pension
benefits if it is assumed that the plaintiff would have continued
to work until normal retirement. Plaintiff's evidence in such
matters is greatly aided by expert testimony. In Ventura v.
Federal Life Insurance Company,7" the plaintiff, who was fifty-
six years old and had vested pension rights at the time of the
pretrial motion, asserted a claim for substantially augmented
pension benefits premised upon the assumption that but for
the illegal discharge, he would have worked for the defendant
until his sixty-second birthday. In support of this position,
the plaintiff submitted an exhibit prepared by a professionally
trained actuarial and employee benefit consultant. The court,
holding that front pay was available under the ADEA,71 de-
nied the defendant's motion to exclude the evidence.
The importance of this issue is best appreciated in context
of the terms of a defined benefit pension plan. These plans
typically compute monthly pension benefits by multiplying a
constant factor by the employee's number of years of credited
service and by the employee's average monthly earnings dur-
ing the highest years of employment. Any plaintiff who was
fifty-six years of age at the time of discharge will be eligible for
an increase of six years credit for service if it is assumed that
the employee would have worked for the defendant until age
sixty-two. Even assuming thirty years of credited service
68. Maxfield, 36 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. (BNA) at 91.
The trial court also applied Craig v. Y&Y Snacks, Inc., 721 F.2d 77 (3d Cir. 1983)
and McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, Inc., 740 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1984), to bar the jury from
offsetting social security benefits from the damage award, but it allowed an offset of
other pension benefits.
69. 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979).
70. 571 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1983).




prior to discharge, this increase alone would augment lifetime
pension benefits by twenty percent. Moreover, the plaintiff's
earnings during the years immediately preceding retirement
are most likely to be substantially larger than earnings preced-
ing the discharge. The difference in the value of these earn-
ings is significant since these benefits are to be paid for the life
of the plaintiff.
VI. A SUGGESTION FOR BROAD CORRELATION
OF ADEA DAMAGES
As a consequence of the piecemeal statutory expression of
ADEA damages and the issue-by-issue judicial analysis of in-
dividual claims, the picture of the ADEA damages has be-
come quite impressionistic. One must keep in mind the
following two fundamental propositions: (1) The illegally dis-
charged employee is to be made whole, which includes being
returned as near as possible to the position the employee
would have been in but for the defendant's illegal action, and
(2) the courts have been provided with broad equitable powers
to remedy age discrimination. In light of the above proposi-
tions, the following ought to be the minimum measure of the
"make-whole" components of an award:
(1) Reimbursement for those actual damages accrued prior
to trial which are capable of proof, including lost wages,
benefits, and direct costs, less income which would not
have been received but for the illegal discharge.
(2) Liquidation of the above in the event of a willful viola-
tion of the Act.
(3) Unless waived, reinstatement, or in lieu thereof, reim-
bursement for future lost earnings and benefits.
Liquidated damages, if awarded, should not be used to off-
set entitlement to future damages. Several circuits have al-
lowed liquidated damages to serve a restitutionary purpose
and have offset entitlement to future damages. 72 As the Sev-
72. Two circuits which held that future damages are available under the ADEA,
but were inappropriate in the circumstances before the court, included collateral causes
of action upon which the plaintiff was successful and received additional recovery.
Cancellier, 672 F.2d at 1318-19 n.8 (three plaintiffs received $338,786, $231,730 and
$197,092 in actual past damages which were liquidated. They also received $260,000,
$180,000 and $200,000 respectively as punitive damages under a pendent state claim);
Wildman, 771 F.2d 605.
1986]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
enth Circuit held in Pfeiffer v. Essex,73 an ADEA plaintiff is
not entitled to damages for "pain and suffering." This follows
the congressional intent that the ADEA's incorporation of the
FLSA's liquidated damages provision is to provide a means
for recovery of sums to cover damages which are too obscure
to be capable of proof. A plaintiff's pain and suffering which
is an obscure damage, is therefore a "liquidated" damage
under this framework. Economic loss following trial, when
reinstatement is not practical or possible, is capable of proof.
If those losses are offset by the value of a liquidated damages
award, then the plaintiff may recover nothing for pain and suf-
fering attributable to the defendant's willful violation of the
ADEA.
The operation of the ADEA liquidated damages provision
is arbitrary. Doubling the pretrial damages may result in
grossly inadequate recovery for "pain and suffering" caused
by a willful violation of the ADEA. On the other hand, it
may overcompensate a plaintiff. The arbitrary operation of
the provision was the choice of Congress. An attempt to min-
imize its possible excesses by reducing the plaintiff's recovery
for future damages, in light of the receipt of liquidated dam-
ages, may accomplish a "rough justice," but at the expense of
interfering with the statutorily mandated remedial scheme.
At the same time, the practice leaves unavailable to the
ADEA plaintiff any mechanism to alleviate potentially inade-
quate recovery for those damages "too obscure" to be capable
of proof. Any change in the operation of this remedy ought to
be accomplished by Congress and not the courts.
73. 682 F.2d 684 (7th Cir. 1982).
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